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1National energy policy faces a deep conflict in objectives: Consumers
want cheap energy, but producers need high prices to justify expanded produc-
tion. This conflict in objectives has been a major reason for our failure
to adopt a rational energy policy. So far the objective of low prices has
dominated policy. Through a combination of measures, some long-standing and
some thrown together quickly during the energy crisis of 1974, the price of
energy to U.S. consumers has been held far below the world price. U.S.
producers have been prohibited from taking advantage of the higher world price,
and in the case of oil, a heavy tax has been imposed on U.S. production to
finance the subsidization of imports. These measures have caused demand to
rise more rapidly than production, and energy imports have risen to fill the
gap between demand and production. If recent policies are continued, imports
will continue to rise. Some painful choices in the objectives of energy policy
will force themselves upon the United States in the next few years.
The economics of this nation's energy problem involves little more than
the principle that higher prices result in less demand and more supply. The exact
magnitudes and timing of the effects of price on demand and supply are still open
to debate, but a summary of recent evidence would say that demand falls by about
1 percent for each 4 percent increase in price, and supply rises by about 1 per-
cent for each 5 percent increase in price. Of course several years must pass
before demand and supply fully respond to changes in price, and there is some
uncertainty over the magnitude and speed of the supply response, but these numbers
provide a reasonable basis for a first-cut description of the U.S. energy market.
Policies in effect today have depressed the U.S. price of energy, on the average,
by about 30 percent below the world price. Consumption, then, is about 8 percent
2higher than it would be otherwise, and supply is about 6 percent lower. Total U.S.
consumption of energy stated in oil-equivalents is about 38 million barrels per
day, of which 31 million are supplied by domestically produced oil, natural gas,
and coal, and the rest is imported. Eight percent of consumption is just
over 3 million barrels per day, and 6 percent of U.S. production is just under
2 million barrels, so the net effect of the policy of depressing prices is to
increase imports by about 5 million barrels. But current imports are around
7 million barrels per day, so a striking conclusion emerges from these simple
calculations: The import problem is largely of our own making. Imports might
well be much lower had our energy policy not been based on the maintenance of
low prices.
Why did we inflict these policies on ourselves if they alone are largely
responsible for the problem of growing imports? It is not that policymakers
are ignorant of the simple economics of supply and demand, nor even that they
underestimated the magnitudes of the price effects. Instead, the real moving
force behind these policies has been the desire to prevent prices to consumers
from rising, and to block the windfall gains that would otherwise have accrued
to producers when world energy prices rose so dramatically in 1973-74 - windfall
gains that would have come directly out of the pockets of consumers. The
stimulus to imports has simply been a by-product of these anti-windfall
policies. The paramount goal has been to prevent a wholesale redistribution
of income from 215 million energy consumers, many of whom are not very well
off, to a handful of producers, most of whom are quite well off. Our policies
have achieved this goal, at least in part, and are unlikely to be displaced by
alternatives that fail to recognize the extreme importance of this goal to the
American public.
3How Current Policies Keep the U.S. Energy Price Low
Two major policies have been primarily responsible for the current large
gap between the world and domestic prices of energy. The first and more
important policy has the general effect of taxing domestic production of crude
oil, and then using the proceeds of the tax to subsidize imports, with no net
effect on the Federal budget. This ingenious program was conceived and executed
in a matter of months in 1974, is in operation today in a somewhat strengthened
form, and is scheduled for demise in 1979. Under its provisions, the Federal
Energy Administration sets an average rice that domestic producers may receive
for their oil (currently $7.66 per barrel). In order to refine domestic crude
oil, however, refiners must purchase a ticket called an entitlement at a cost
of approximately $2.00 per barrel. This cost is the tax on domestic production.
On the other hand, refiners who import their crude oil at the world price of
about $12.50 per barrel receive entitlements worth about $3.00 per barrel. This
is the way that imports are subsidized. The effective cost of oil to refiners
from either source is the same $9.50 per barrel. If the system were eliminated
today, domestic producers of crude oil would receive the world price (which would
mean an increase of about $5.00, or 65 percent above what they currently receive),
and this would, after two or three years, increase the domestic supply of oil by
about 13 percent. The cost of oil to refiners would rise by about 32 percent, and
these higher costs wouId be passed on to consumers. Price increases to consumers
would depend on the particular petroleum product; retail gasoline prices, for
example, would increase by about 7 cents per gallon.
It is ironic that the desire to limit the flow of income from consumers to
producers has the side effect of putting the U.S. government in the business of
subsidizing oil imports, a large part of which come from OPEC - the villain of
4the price increase in the first place. But the government is incapable of
dictating the selling price of oil produced outside the U.S., and as long as
the U.S. price is controlled and imports fill the gap between domestic produc-
tion and demand, a subsidy for imports is a logical necessity. As imports con-
tinue to grow, greater and greater strains will be placed on the tax and subsidy
program. As the total dollar volume of ths subsidy increases and the domestic
base for the tax shrinks, continuation of the program will ultimately require
some revenue out of the Federal budget - unless the average domestic price for
oil is allowed to rise. The planned elimination of the program early in 1979
seems problematical from today's perspective. The powerful forces that brought
the program into being in 1974 will certainly not have disappeared, and no matter
what the state of our economy is in 1979, it will be argued that it is too fragile
to sustain the shock of increased oil prices. Government manipulation of the oil
price may well turn out to be a permanent feature of the U.S. eocnomy.
The second major policy directed at maintaining a low domestic price of energy
is the long-standing regulation of the price of natural gas by the Federal Power
Commission. The average price of natural gas at the wellhead has been held far
below the world price of energy for a long time, and this has resulted in domestic
shortages of natural gas well before the 1973 oil embargo. This policy results in
a substantial subsidy for the consumption of natural gas by those who are able to
obtain it (mainly households but also industries in some parts of the country).
Those unable to obtain natural gas must shift their demand to oil or electricity.
The effect of this price policy has been to increase the demand for energy by about
one or two million barre 3sof oil-equivalents per day, and thus is a major contri-
butor to the import problem. The policy has also limited the supply of natural
gas, since even the prices for new contracts have been held well below world prices.
5It is likely that the Federal Power Commission will significantly increase new
contract prices - but probably not to the level of the world price - and average
wellhead prices will rise only slowly as old contracts expire. The deregulation
of natural gas markets has made little progress, again because of the redistri-
bution of income from consumers to producers that it entails.
Where is energy policy headed? In the next two or three years, national
energy policy will be forced to resolve the conflict between low prices and self-
sufficiency. The dangers of mistakes in energy policy are as much in adopting
inappropriate and costly programs as in failing to adopt economically sensible
programs. Sound economic principles lead to a set of recommendations, first
about what policy should not do, and then what it should do.
wh ~  ~ . .. _.~" - _ y s.'~- . - . . . .. .... . ... _. . .. ... .. . . ... .What Energy Policy Should NOT Do:
Continuation of present policies that keep the price of energy artificially
low are likely to bring about two responses from policy-makers, neither of which
is desirable. First, there will be growing pressure to control energy consump-
tion by methods other than price increases. A variety of schemes are likely to
be devised, including controls on the types of cars that people are permitted to
buy and on the speed they drive them and controls on the amount of heating and
lighting that they may use. So far, we have tried only the increasingly unpopular
and unenforced speed limit reduction and have announced fuel mileage requirements
for cars built in the future. Pressure will mount to impose further controls
as imports grow. Proponents of these programs label them as "conservation," but
that is not a fair use of the term. The energy crisis has long since shaken out
much of the pure waste of energy that existed before, and most of the waste that
remains is largely the result of selling energy at a price well below its true value.
6Controls unnecessarily limit people's choices, and make them worse off by
making their lives colder and dimmer and limiting their ability to travel.
The problems of enforcing the 55 mph speed limit call attention to the diffi-
culty of making effective any policy for limiting demand below that level
that people would freely choose given the price of energy. It is not realistic
to project large energy savings from the legislation of reduced temperatures in
homes or offices, or reduced travel. Attempts to do the impossible simply dis-
credit the government. Some conservation policies do make good economic sense
in the present environment where the price of energy is below its true value,
for example, encouraging home owners to insulate their homes by offering them
low-interest loans. However, the need for this kind of conservation would
shrink dramatically if the U.S. price of energy were raised to the appropriate
level.
The second major threat of mistaken policy is that the taxpayers will be
asked to finance the difference between the high cost of producing energy in the
U.S. and the low price that consumers are asked to pay. For years the U.S. has
subsidized nuclear electrical power, yet even today the future of nuclear power
is under serious question. Recent policy is moving even further in the direction
of subsidized production, as the Energy Research and Development Administration
(ERDA) is financing domestic energy projects that make sense only if there is a
permanent guarantee from the tax-payers that the output can be sold for considerably
more than the current world price. But it is an illusion to think that Americans
are better off with higher taxes in place of higher energy prices. Individuals can
choose to avoid high energy prices by limiting their consumption, but high taxes
must be paid no matter what level of consumption is chosen.
7The principal danger from this type of mistaken policy today is deep government
involvement in exotic new forms of energy, notably the gasification of coal and the
extraction of oil from shale rock. So far private industry has been unwilling to
undertake the commercialization of these energy forms, because they are too expensive,
and are likely to remain too expensive for some time in the future. Cost estimates
for these energy forms are continually revised upwards every year; curiously, the
cost of shale oil is invariably estimated to be around $6 above the world price of
oil, no matter what the world price of oil happens to be. It is no wonder, then, that
private firms are unwilling to construct coal gasification or shale oil facilities -
these energy forms are simply bad bets. They are not commercially viable, and are
not likely to become commercially viable for years to come, even if OPEC raises the
price of oil further. Rather than subsidize costly new energy sources, it is prefer-
able to purchase oil from OPEC at world market prices. Offering government guarantees
or subsidies to developers of these energy forms means requiring the nation to pay
much more for energy than is necessary.
Those who support government participation in the commercialization of non-
conventional energy forms claim that the risk associated with developing these
forms is too great to be undertaken by private industry. There is some risk, but
almost none is caused by the small likelihood that OPEC will reduce the world oil
price. Full decontrol of oil and gas prices will eliminate the risk caused by
present government controls. Most of the risk is just the normal uncertainty
associated with any venture involving new and complex technology - and is not the
reason that private industry is unwilling to undertake these projects. The problem
is that these projects are just not commercially viable, and would not become
commercially viable even if OPEC were to continue to increase prices at the rate
of 10 percent or 15 percent a year for the next ten years.
8What Energy Policv SHOULD Do:
1. Eliminate Price Controls on Oil and Natural Gas
It is of primary importance to move quickly towards the deregulation of oil
and natural gas prices. Past and current price controls have resulted in short-
ages, increased imports, and the prospectof higher than necessary prices in the
future. In addition, they have resulted in the wasteful consumption of energy
resources that have been artificially priced below their true value.
We have already explained how the present system of price controls on crude
oil results in the subsidization of a growing level of imports. If present price
controls continue, domestic oil production will diminish as demand continues to
grow, and we will soon face an unacceptably high level of imports that will ulti-
mately have to be subsidized directly from general tax revenues. It is therefore
essential that crude oil prices be decontrolled. This will result in greater
discoveries and reserve additions of oil, as well as greater production out of
existing but currently uneconomic reserves. By increasing supply and decreasing
demand, higher oil prices are a more efficient way to reduce imports than a simple
tax that affects only demand. Furthermore, the deregulation of crude oil prices
would result in a lessening'of the uncertainty over future prices that is now
associated with uncertainty over government policy. The decontrol of crude oil
prices could be done slowly - perhaps over three or four years - in order to avoid
a sudden inflationary shock on the macroeconomy, but the process should begin soon.
The regulation of natural gas markets has been an issue before the Congress
for some time, but unfortunately has resulted in no action. Studies of the
natural gas market show that if wellhead prices for natural gas are fixed at
9their recent levels for the next two years, we will experience shortages aver-
aging about 25 to 30 percent of total demand by the end of that time. Further-
more, these shortages will not be spread out evenly across the country, but
will be concentrated in particular areas, so that in some states shortages that
are more than 50 percent of total demand will occur. This means that curtail-
ments of natural gas will spread beyond industrial consumers to residential and
commercial consumers as well, so that households may have their sources of energy
for heating and cooking turned off. But even if curtailments are limited to
industrial consumers, they will result in reduced output and increased unemploy-
ment, both directly and indirectly through the effects of supply bottlenecks.
Obviously shortages such as these would be extremely harmful, and they must be
avoided.
Shortages of natural gas could be partially dealt with by importing liquified
natural gas (LNG). But just as a scalper is able to sell tickets to a Broadway
show at an unreasonably high price when the box office price has been set too low,
LNG represents an unreasonably costly alternative to domestic natural gas that,
under deregulation, could be purchased at lower prices. In addition, the primary
exporters of LNG (Algeria and Indonesia) are members of OPEC. It is interesting
to note that recent contracts signed with these exporters call for a wholesale
price (after regasification in the the United States) of $4 to $5 per thousand
cubic feet - about double the average world market price for energy, and equivalent
to oil at $24 to $30 per barrel. Consumers have been saved from higher prices
through regulation, only to have to face still higher prices for LNG imports.
Theeffects of natural gas shortages go beyond natural gas markets, and result
in increased demand for oil, coal, and electricity. Users who are unable to obtain
natural gas do not conserve energy as an alternative - instead they switch to other
fuels, which means greater imports.
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Econometric research into natural gas and oil markets indicates that a new
contract wellhead price of about $1.70 per thousand cubic feet would be suffi-
cient to clear natural gas markets within two or three years given current crude
oil prices, and new contract prices of about $2.00 would be sufficient to clear
markets given higher oil prices resulting from the removal of oil price controls.
By contrast, the new contract wellhead price has recently been set by the Federal
Power Commission at about 50 to 60 cents. The FPC has recently attempted to raise
the new contract price to $1.42, but so far has been blocked from doing so by the
courts. This policy shift by the FPC represents a large step in the right direc-
tion, but is still not enough, since with decontrolled oil prices natural gas
would still be underpriced by about 25 percent, and this would result in the need
for growing LNG imports.
The decontrol of natural gas markets should proceed in the following manner,
assuming the simultaneous decontrol of oil prices. New contract prices should be
allowed to rise to $1.50 in the beginning of 1977, to $1.75 by the beginning of
1978, to $2.00 by the beginning of 1979, and new contract prices should be free of
all controls by the beginning of 1980. The practice of "rolling in" prices (i.e.
averaging high new contract prices with low old contract prices, so that the con-
sumer faces a price somewhere in between) means that average wellhead prices would
not reach the $2.00 level until 1983. On the other hand, natural gas supply will
increase significantly over the next few years under decontrol.
2. Protect the Poor
Policy-makers have been guided by a strong desire to keep prices paid by con-
sumers from rising. We must recognize that the decontrol of natural gas and crude
oil prices will indeed result in higher fuel prices for consumers: retail natural
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gas prices. will increase by about 40 percent to 50 percent by 1982, and
residential fuel oil prices will increase by about 25 percent to 30 percent,
and this will place a significant burden on lower income families. A new
energy policy must therefore include measures to offset this burden. Expansion
of the present food stamp program so that it covers fuel as well as food expend-
itures is the most promising way to help the poor. Food stamp allotments should
be increased and home heating bills (or that portion of a family's rent that
would be allocated to fuels) and gasoline purchases as well as food should be
covered by the stamps.
The cost to the taxpayer for this program would be modest. The expanded
food stamp program would be aimed at the lowest 20 percent of the income distri-
bution, a group that consumes about 7 percent of the energy used for heating,
cooking, and transportation in this country,or about .4 billion barrels of oil
equivalent per year. Since the complete decontrol of oil and natural gas would
result in an average price increase of about $5 per barrel of oil equivalent, the
cost of the program would be about $2 billion per year, which represents only a
15 percent increase in the cost of our current food stamp program. An improved
stamp program would be much less costly to the taxpayer than subsidizing the
energy consumption of all consumers.
3. Prepare Now to Counteract Future Oil Embargoes
Though an improved energy policy would reduce oil imports dramatically, some
imports would continue, and it is likely that they will rise over the years as
the growth in energy demand associated with economic growth outstrips the growth
in domestic energy supply. Dependence on imports raises a serious issue of
national security. An anti-embargo policy is essential to prevent OPEC, especially
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its Arab members, from influencing U.S. international policy. With effective
anti-embargo policies in place, the likelihood of an embargo is diminished, and
should one occur its effect is minimized. In the absence of such policies, the
threat of an embargo is almost as effective as an embargo itself.
The most important anti-embargo policies are standby programs that can be
brought into action quickly after an embargo takes effect. A comprehensive
policy should include the following programs:
a. Standby domestic sources of oil. The U.S. has already undertaken a
small program for storing a crude oil reserve; this program should
be continued and enlarged. In addition, existing government-owned
petroleum reserves ought to be brought into production quickly during
future embargoes. Finally, state regulation of roduction should be
loosened during an embargo, as it was during World War II.
b. Standby programs for limiting oil consumption. Tax incentives or other
methods should be used to induce utilities to prepare to convert to
coal in the event of an embargo. This may require the stockpiling of
coal in some regions. Federal taxes on oil, especially gasoline, should
be increased substantially during an embargo to limit lower-priority
uses. Regulated sectors dependent on oil, including trucking, railroads,
and airlines, should be permitted to raise their rates immediately to
pass through these higher taxes to induce their customers to limit
consumption of energy-intensive services.
c. Increase food-energy stamp allotments during an embargo. The adverse
effect of increased energy prices during an embargo should be offset
for poor families by an increase in their share of food-energy stamps.
Since poor families consume relatively little energy, it is not necessary
to ask them to make the same proportional reduction in energy consumption
during an embargo as families who are better off.
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d. Expansionary monetary and fiscal policy. The economy should be kept
on an even keel with a limited rate of inflation so that it will
never find itself fighting high inflation at the same time an embargo
is imposed. Then the country will be in a position to tolerate the
modest burst of inflation that inevitably will accompany an embargo.
Further, the proper use of the food-energy stamp program will limit
the damaging effect ~of this inflation on the real incomes of the
poor. In this environment, some extra stimulus from monetary and
fiscal policy will be feasible to counteract the adverse effects of
an embargo on unemployment and GNP. We emphasize that both the
embargo itself and the expansionary response to it are somewhat infla-
tionary. However, the termination of an embargo and the removal of
the anti-embargo policies will have an anti-inflationary effect that
will come close to offsetting the original inflation, and an embargo
should have no lasting effect on the price level.
These programs would sharply limit the damaging effects of future embargoes.
We believe that a successful anti-embargo policy is compatible with fairly high
levels of imports, even levels exceeding today's level. Unfortunately many believe
that national security can be achieved only with a substantial reduction in oil
imports. But permanent import-reduction is an extremely expensive way to guard
against a temporary embargo that may never come. A large reduction in imports
can be achieved only with a large increase in the U.S. price level. Experience
with the 1975 tariff on oil imports showed unequivocally that the tariff not only
increases the price of the oil we import, but also increases the price of the oil
produced here by the same amount. Moreover, a tariff on oil increases the prices
of other energy sources as well. A deliberate policy of inflation to limit
oil imports is simply counter-productive, especially when there are better ways
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to achieve the goal of security that are not at all inflationary except in the
unlikely event of .an embargo.
Had the above rules been followed during the 1973-1974 embargo, the stress
placed on the country at the time would have been much less. In fact, govern-
ment policy did nothing to increase domestic supplies during the embargo. Govern-
ment reserves were not brought into production, nothing was ever done about state
restrictions on production, and efforts to limit oil consumption were limited to
the 55 mile an hour speed limit. As prices rose, little was done to help the
poor, and the lack of assistance to the poor was a major obstacle to a construc-
tive response to the embargo. In addition, the government did not meet the embargo
with an expansionary monetary and fiscal policy - instead a tax increase was pro-
posed while the effects of the embargo were still being felt, and monetary policy
during and just after the embargo were more contractionary than at any time in the
previous 30 years.
The federal government relied almost entirely on a single tool to deal with
the embargo. It created a gigantic bureaucracy, the Federal Energy Administration,
which attempted to make itself-responsible for the movement of every barrel of oil
in the United States. Even though the FEA did nothing to increase supply, and
very little to decrease demand, it thought that somehow it could "allocate" oil
to users so that everything came out even anyway. But allocation without balancing
supply and demand was impossible, and the result was long lines for gasoline.
4. Support Energy Research
Though the government.should keep out of the development and production phases
of energy supply, government support of basic research on a reasonable scale is a
good economic policy. Better knowledge of energy sources not currently in wide-
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spread use has an especially high social value beyond the incentives facing
private researchers. Ideas and techniques developed in publicly-supported
research should be made freely available, and the private sector can be counted
upon to commercialize new energy sources that make good economic sense, without
any government subsidies.
Good candidates for research support include solar energy, which is the only
source of power free of thermal pollution, as well as new technologies for energy
conservation. On the other hand, coal gasification and shale oil, although non-con-
ventional, are beginning to move beyond the research stage, and should only receive
support aimed at the development of new technologies that might make these energy
sources economic in the future.
In addition, there should be a shift in the current allocation of research
funds. Currently over 45 percent of all energy research funds is directed towards
nuclear power while only 5 percent is allocated to conservation. Given the poten-
tial environmental and security hazards of nuclear power, together with its ques-
tionable economic viability, we would do well to re-allocate some of these funds
to other non-conventional energy sources.
5. Undermine the OPEC Cartel
Today's high world price for energy is directly the result of the monopoly
power of OPEC. The difficult problems of energy policy would largely disappear
if OPEC were to disintegrate and the price of oil were to fall to $3 or $4 per
barrel. Even though OPEC is by all appearances in robust health today, the U.S.
should do whatever it can to weaken the cartel and encourage its members to cut
the price of oil. M.A. Adelman of M.I.T. has proposed an ingenious scheme that
deserves a trial. Under the Adelman plan, tickets would be sold in an anonymous
auction to the highest bidders. Each ticket would give the holder the right to
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import one barrel of oil. The tickets would be freely transferable, and an
active resale market would be encouraged. The system would encourage cheating
by permitting OPEC countries to establish brokers who would bid for and purchase
tickets in the United States.
Suppose that Libya would like to increase its production by selling a certain
amount of oil to the United States at a price $2.00 below the posted OPEC price. Then
a broker representing Libya would bid for and purchase tickets (at a price of $2.00
per ticket) that would be transferred to an importing company in return for an agree-
ment to buy oil from Libya. This kind of price undercutting would be hard to detect,
since Libya would appear to be selling oil at the posted price, but in fact would
be giving a $2.00 rebate to the U.S. Government in return for an assured sale.
It would be unwise to put too much hope in the success of this plan in spite
of its ingenuity. It may result in some price undercutting, but it is unlikely
to significantly weaken OPEC, and policy-makers should probably plan on OPEC setting
the world oil price for years to come. On the other hand the plan could at
least result in the collection of substantial revenues at OPEC's expense, and it
should therefore be implemented as soon as possible.
The Outlook for Energy Policy
If our present policies are continued, and if our GNP grows in real terms by
about 4 percent per year, the total demand for energy in this country will reach
about 44 million barrels per day of oil equivalent by 1980. Domestic production,
however, will remain roughly constant at 32 million barrels per day. This will
mean a growth in oil imports to around 12 or 13 million barrels er day (about 30%
of our total energy consumption, and 70 percent of our oil consumption), or else
increased subsidization of high-priced non-conventional enerRy sources and increased
imports of high-priced LNG to help close the growing gap between consumption and
production. Although the average price of all domestically produced energy could
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be held below $8.00 per barrel of oil equivalent, the true cost of energy to
consumers would begin to rise rapidly as greater tax revenues are used to
support the import program and to subsidize non-conventional sources, as taxes
are imposed on energy consumption, and as the cost of LNG imports is averaged
in with the cost of domestic energy and oil imports.
On the other hand, if the policies outlined above are adopted, the total
demand for energy would rise to only 40 million barrels per day in 1980, and
supply would increase to 34 or 35 million barrels per day. This would mean a reduc-
tion in oil imports to about 5 or 6 million barrels per day, a level that would impose
no strain on the country's economic and political security. The price of energy
would rise to an average of about $12.50 per barrel, but the poor would be buff-
ered from this price increase, and consumers in general would have the option of
avoiding some of the extra expense by using less energy - as opposed to being
forced to subsidize the lower price through their taxes.
Adoption of the set of policies we recommend would be a startling turnabout.
For the next few years, at least, policy-makers are likely to choose to limp along
under the present regime of cheap energy for consumers achieved by subsidizing a
growing volume of imports from OPEC. Very soon, however, the limitations of this
policy will become painfully apparent. It is only a matter of a few years until
the continuation of the present level of subsidy will be feasible only if funds
from the federal budget are available to augment the diminishing yield of the
present heavy tax on domestic oil production. Then we will enter an era of a grow-
ing flow of funds directly from U.S. taxpayers to OPEC, or preferably, growing
acceptance of the need for a higher energy price. But it would be much better to
anticipate this problem by moving today toward higher energy prices. Delay will
only make the eventual accommodation to the high world energy price all the more
difficult.
